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| open Democracy News Analysis - http://www.opendemocracy.net en Venezuela: revolution in flux , Ivan Briscoe http://www.opendemocracy.net/article/venezuela-troops-polls-and-an-itch-at-the-top <p>A couple of months before Latin Americafollowed Wall Street into the whirlpools, Venezuela was experimenting with acurious, unnoticed and utterly revolutionary version of financial meltdown."It is our resolve to keep on helping Argentina", beamed PresidentHugo Chávez as he placed his signature on the dotted line.</p><p><span class="pullquote_new">Ivan Briscoe is senior researcher at the <a href=""http://www.fride.org/"><em>Fundacion" para las RelacionesInte</em><em>r</em><em>nacionales y el Dialogo Exterior</em></a><em> </em>(Fride), Madrid. He was previously editor ofthe English edition of <em>El País</em><em>BuenosAires Herald</em>, the <em>UNESCO Courier</em><br /><br />This article is written in Ivan Briscoe'spersonal capacity and does not represent the views of <a href=""http://www.fride.org/homepage_english">Fride</a><br" /><br />His previous articles for <strong>openDemocracy</strong><a href="http://www.opendemocracy.net/xml/rss/home/index.xml/"/node/1167">Argentina:" how politicians survivewhile people starve</a>" (17 April2003)<br /><br />"<a href="http://www.opendemocracy.net/xml/rss/home/index.xml/"/democracy-protest/article_1396.jsp">Beyond" thezero sum: from Chávez to Lula</a>"(30 July 2003)<br /><br />"<a href="http://www.opendemocracy.net/xml/rss/home/index.xml/"/democracy-protest/argentinapolitics_2538.jsp">NèstorKirchner's" Argentina: a journey from hell</a><br /><br />" (25 May 2005)<br /><br />"<a href="http://www.opendemocracy.net/xml/rss/home/index.xml/"/democracy-protest/latin_summit_2936.jsp?1">The" new Latinchoir: democracy vs injustice in Latin America</a><br /><br />" (18 October 2005)"<a href="http://www.opendemocracy.net/xml/rss/home/index.xml/"/democracy-protest/venezuela_3255.jsp">Venezuela:" arevolution in contraflow</a>"(10February 2006)<br /><br />"<a href="http://www.opendemocracy.net/xml/rss/home/index.xml/"/node/3947">Latin" America's new left: dictatorsor democrats?</a>" (28September 2006)<br /><br />"<a href="http://www.opendemocracy.net/xml/rss/home/index.xml/"/democracy-protest/nicaragua_ortega_4057.jsp">Never" let mego: can Ortega reclaim Nicaragua?</a>"(2 November 2006) <br /><br />"<a href="http://www.opendemocracy.net/xml/rss/home/index.xml/"/node/4250">Evo" Morales: the unauthorised version</a>" (16 January 2007)"<a href="http://www.opendemocracy.net/xml/rss/home/index.xml/"/democracy-protest/latin_ship_4461.jsp">A" ship with noanchor: Bush in Latin America</a>"(22 March2007)<br /><br />"<a href="http://www.opendemocracy.net/xml/rss/home/index.xml/"/conflict-falklands_malvinas/argentina_briscoe_4491.jsp">Argentina" andthe Malvinas, twenty-five years on</a>"(2 April 2007)<br /><br />"<a href="http://www.opendemocracy.net/xml/rss/home/index.xml/"/article/democracy_power/politics_protest/chavez_control">Venezuela:" isHugo Chávez in control?</a>" (9 August 2007)<br /><br />"<a href="http://www.opendemocracy.net/xml/rss/home/index.xml/"/article/democray_power/politics_protest/guatemala">Guatemala:" a good place to kill</a>" (17 October 2007)<br /><br />"<a href="http://www.opendemocracy.net/xml/rss/home/index.xml/"/article/globalisation/politics_after_charisma">Latin" America's dynamic:politics after charisma</a>" (19 December2007)<br /><br />"<a href="http://www.opendemocracy.net/xml/rss/home/index.xml/"/article/democracy_power/politics_protest/spain_s_election_lessons">From" the shadows: Spain'selection lessons</a>" (11 March 2008)<br /><br />"<a href="http://www.opendemocracy.net/xml/rss/home/index.xml/"/article/argentina-a-crisis-of-riches">Argentina:" a crisis of riches</a>" (17 July 2008)"T<a href="http://www.opendemocracy.net/xml/rss/home/index.xml/"/usa/blog/ivan_briscoe/kirchner_obama_latin_left">he" mirror stage: Obama and theLatin left</a> " (21 August 2008) - in <a href="http://www.opendemocracy.net/xml/rss/home/index.xml/"/usa">openUSA</a>newspaper" in Madrid and also worked for the and in the field of development research. include: "</span>The $1 billion of Argentine state debt that hebought were added to a previous $6 billion, <a href=""http://blogs.salon.com/0001330/2008/08/07.html">purchased</a>since" 2005. From the skulking concrete of Venezuela's central bank, the bondspassed at lightning speed, sprinkling profits as they went: from the state togrossly overpaid brokers, to private banks and onto big investors, each timewith the exchange rate into local currency climbing and the dollar valuefalling. At journey's end, an act of solidarity had sent Argentina's debtratings into casualty.</p><p>As Venezuela's yearly electoral seasonapproaches - this time in regional and local elections, to be <a href=""http://www.laht.com/article.asp?ArticleId=320944&CategoryId=10717">held</a>" on 23 November 2008 - the bullish feats ofHugo Chávez's last year, from Russian naval exercises in the Caribbean to the expulsionof <a href=""http://www.hrw.org/en/americas/venezuela">Human" Rights Watch</a>, sit alongside the stunned relics of apolitical flash-flood. The debt purchases are on hold, and cooperatives are outof fashion. Food prices, once controlled, have steamed upwards. And the great politicalforce unveiled by Chávez in the hour of his zenith, the <em>Partido Socialista Unido de Venezuela</em> (United Socialist Party ofVenezuela / <a href=""http://www.rnv.gov.ve/noticias/index.php?act=ST&f=31&t=82936">PSUV</a>)," is entering the poll facing a threat fromthe opposition in at least six states out of the twenty-three being contested,and from dissident <em>chavistas</em> in atleast three more. At times, the president's enormous pedagogical patience withthe faithful wears thin.</p><p>"Revolutionary discipline!" heinsisted early in November before a red-shirted crowd in the state of Mirandaas he got into campaign stride: ticking off the indolent canvassers, seizingtheir electoral lists, and phoning the voters himself.</p><p>The pollsters, however, point to a trend thathas deepened since the middle of 2007. Chávez's hard core of loyalists, onceclose to half the <a href=""http://go.hrw.com/atlas/norm_htm/venezula.htm">country</a>," has withered to around 20% of Venezuela'selectorate. In between the devoted and the enemy stretch an ever wideningground of neutrals and "soft" <em>chavistas</em>,fearful of Venezuela's oligarchy but <a href=""http://www.angus-reid.com/polls/view/32049/venezuelans_split_on_current_state_of_nation">uncertain</a>" how much revolution they can take (see "<a href="http://www.opendemocracy.net/xml/rss/home/index.xml/"/article/democracy_power/politics_protest/chavez_control"><u>Venezuela:" isHugo Chávez in control?</u></a>", 9 August 2007).</p><p>Losing the <a href=""http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/a3a16356-a20d-11dc-a13b-0000779fd2ac.html">vote</a>" on constitutional reform in December 2007 inthe hillside warrens of Petare or the district of Libertador signified the endof the Caracas bastions, worn down by food shortages, crime and low-levelcorruption. The movement's intellectual elites foresaw and welcomed a time ofconsolidation; Chávez duly granted their wish, proclaiming the need to"review, rectify and recharge" (the three r's, as they are known).For once, it seemed, the great man would sit back and entertain a debate forthe eyes and ears of the world on what socialism in a time of plenty can mean.</p><p>Silence followed. There has been no internaldebate, nor has the action stopped. Ideological fissures and impulses trembleacross Venezuela every day: new state takeovers worth around $12 billion,twenty-six <a href=""http://www.angus-reid.com/analysis/view/31495/venezuela_socialism_by_decree">decree-laws</a>" on almost every realm of policy signed on 31July, massive <a href=""http://en.rian.ru/world/20081107/118181084.html">arms" purchases</a> from Russia. Every day the government followsEzra Pound's injunction to "make it new", even if the direction takenremains blurred, indecipherable, drowned in jargon and anti-imperialtheorising. Meanwhile, as oil falls beneath $70 a barrel, the magic figure atwhich Venezuela can sustain its spending according to former central-bankgovernor Maza Zabala, the edifice is starting to <a href=""http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=5583">look</a>" decidedly shaky.</p><p>In mid-summer, weeks after the package ofdecree-laws was passed at the stroke of Chávez's pen, passers-by outside ametro station in Caracas could hear a saleswoman's pitch, off-setting thedeadening hot midday sun. "New law on transport" she plaintivelycalled at the pedestrians as they shuffled from sunlight to the dark hollows ofthe underground. "New law on social security, new law on the populareconomy, new law...." </p><p>The television screens run by the statedrummed the message home: "In a revolution, the people's happiness is thelaw."</p><p><strong>"Let thepeople decide"</strong></p><p>For his <a href=""http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/b64872f8-b76d-11dd-8e01-0000779fd18c.html">critics</a>," the about-turns of the last year simply markan acceleration of Chávez's political hallmark - his ability to shift from thebonhomie of moderation to autocratic stampede in a matter of seconds. "Oneside of his brain is Girondin, and the other is Jacobin" observes theacerbic <a href=""http://venepoetics.blogspot.com/2008/04/stalinismo-tropical-teodoro-petkoff.html">critic</a>" Teodoro Petkoff (see Jon Lee Anderson, "<a href=""http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2008/06/23/080623fa_fact_anderson?currentPage=all">Fidel's" Heir</a>", <em>NewYorker</em>, 23 June 2008). Chávez's free-thinking promise on his creation ofthe PSUV has likewise swerved violently. "Enough of the little finger, thefinger and almost always my finger", he told the adoring crowd in December2006, "let the people take the decisions." One of the first creationsin the party's structure, however, was its discipline committee.</p><p>The attitude towards the conditions thatunderlie the government's ten-year existence - the inclusion of the poor, therefoundation of the political system - verges on the insolent. In Venezuela,but also in Argentina, and to a disturbing extreme in <a href="http://www.opendemocracy.net/xml/rss/home/index.xml/"/article/nicaragua-a-scene-of-heartbreak">Nicaragua</a>," the triumphant left seems to be growingcareless towards the integrity of its project. Bold reforms and domesticstand-offs have given way to a closed circle of self-supporting rhetoric, whilethe gritty details of state management are skated over in favour of euphoricannouncements. Private pensions worth $30 billion are nationalised in Argentinafor reasons that are unclear. In Venezuela, business "hoarders" arepersecuted, 270 allegedly corrupt candidates are struck off the electorallists, and the military is put on alert should the opposition win the state ofZulia.</p><p>As the state stepped in to rescue high capitalaround the world, Chávez made clear that his methods would be different."Bankers can forget about us doing the same. I'll take over the banks,I'll expropriate them."</p><p>None of this should downplay what has been <a href=""http://hdrstats.undp.org/countries/data_sheets/cty_ds_VEN.html">achieved</a>" in welfare or poverty- reduction, or inbuilding communities that are now organised enough to express their irritationswhere no one gave a damn before. But unease stalks supporters' minds. In theeditor's suite of <a href=""http://www.ultimasnoticias.com.ve/"><em>ÚltimasNoticias</em></a>," Venezuela's biggest-sellingdaily, traditional <em>chavista</em>sympathies are being sorely tested. The paper is immersed in local life, inpotholes and murders, but its editor, Eleazar Díaz Rangel shrugs his shoulders,and seems unsure as to where the state is heading.</p><p>"No one knows how the three r's have beenachieved. There's no general assessment of the errors and what changes to make.But it is clear that the person trying to recharge (<em>reimpulsar</em>) the process is Chávez."</p><p>For <a href=""http://www.cpa2.org/cpa2/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=68&Itemid=58">Juan" Carlos Monedero</a>, a Spanish associate of Chávez's leadingthink- tank, the <a href=""http://centrointernacionalmiranda.gob.ve/"><em>CentroInternacional" Miranda</em></a>, the bases of adecent state and public life are still being laid in an oil-drenched society.But even he recognises the depth of concern: there is, "a metastasis ofCaesarism", of total control of every detail of state by one solitary man."It's time to make internal discussion a democratic requisite, to multipledissidences", he wrote after the December 2007 <a href="http://www.opendemocracy.net/xml/rss/home/index.xml/"/article/democracy_power/why_chavez_lost">referendum</a>" defeat. Yet none of this has happened. Theprevailing note of the time is intellectual paralysis and political writhing.The question is why.<span class="pullquote_new">What is happening in Venezuela? <br /><br /><strong>openDemocracy</strong>'s many articles on theHugo Chávez years offer detailed, independent analysis and argument in theinterests of informed understanding. <br /><br />They include:Jonah Gindin & William I Robinson, <br /><br />"<a href="http://www.opendemocracy.net/xml/rss/home/index.xml/"/democracy-protest/venezuala_2730.jsp">The" United States, Venezuela,and "democracy promotion</a>"(4 August 2005)<br /><br />Ben Schiller, "<a href="http://www.opendemocracy.net/xml/rss/home/index.xml/"/globalization-china/china_venezuela_3319.jsp">The" axis of oil: China andVenezuela</a>" (2 March 2006)<br /><br />George Philip, "<a href="http://www.opendemocracy.net/xml/rss/home/index.xml/"/democracy-protest/venezuela_oil_3580.jsp">The" politics of oil in Venezuela</a>" (24 May 2006)<br /><br />Phil Gunson, "<a href="http://www.opendemocracy.net/xml/rss/home/index.xml/"/democracy-protest/chavez_solidarity_3642.jsp">Hugo" Chávez's provocativesolidarity</a>" (14 June 2006)<br /><br />Phil Gunson, "<a href="http://www.opendemocracy.net/xml/rss/home/index.xml/"/democracy-protest/bolivarian_4146.jsp">Bolivarian" myths and legends</a>" (1 December 2006)<br /><br />Juan Gabriel Tokatlian, "<a href="http://www.opendemocracy.net/xml/rss/home/index.xml/"/democracy-protest/tokatlian_longview_4429.jsp">After" Bush: dealing with HugoChávez</a>" (13 March 2007)<br /><br />George Philip, "<a href="http://www.opendemocracy.net/xml/rss/home/index.xml/"/democracy-protest/oil_philip_4478.jsp">Hugo" Chávez at his peak</a>" (28 March 2007)Phil Gunson, "<a href="http://www.opendemocracy.net/xml/rss/home/index.xml/"/democracy-protest/chavez_supremo_4523.jsp">Hugo" Chávez: <em>yo</em>, <em>el</em> <em>supremo</em></a>" (13 April 2007)<br /><br />Julia Buxton, "<a href="http://www.opendemocracy.net/xml/rss/home/index.xml/"/democracy-protest/deepening_revolution_4592.jsp">The" deepening of Venezuela'sBolivarian revolution: why most people don't get it</a>" (4 May 2007)<br /><br />Stephanie Blankenburg, "<a href="http://www.opendemocracy.net/xml/rss/home/index.xml/"/article/democracy_power/why_chavez_lost">Venezuela:" a complicatedreferendum</a>" (4 Devember 2008)<br /><br />Adam Isacson, "<a href="http://www.opendemocracy.net/xml/rss/home/index.xml/"/article/democracy_power/the_colombia_venezuela_ecuador_tangle">The" Colombia - Venezuela -Ecuador tangl</a>e" (17 March 2008)<br /><br />Julia Buxton, "<a href="http://www.opendemocracy.net/xml/rss/home/index.xml/"/article/hugo-chavez-and-venezuela-questions-of-leadership">Hugo" Chávez and Venezuela:questions of leadership</a>" (25 September2008) </span></p><p><strong>Power and betrayal</strong></p><p>General Raúl Isaías Baduel is widely regardedas a privileged observer of this process. In the founding myth that Hugo Chávezhas propagated of his rise to power, Baduel is there - one of the four soldierswho took a revolutionary oath in 1982 under the <em>Samán de Güere</em>, the tree where <a href=""http://www.yalebooks.co.uk/yale/display.asp?K=9780300126044&sf1=author&st1=John%2520Lynch&m=2&dc=3">Simon" Bolívar</a> is said to have rested before routing theSpaniards in 1821. Twenty years later, Baduel led the campaign to rescue Chávezfrom a coup, commanding the helicopters that brought the exile back to Caracas.Until 2007, few had shown such unbending loyalty.</p><p>In an office given to him by apublic-relations executive, Baduel is setting out on the next, uncertain stageof his career - that of insider turned <a href=""http://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/21/world/americas/21venez.html">antagonist</a>." Hunched in his blazer, recovering from acold, the general recounts the troubles he has just had: pincered between twocars a few weeks before, his vehicle was shot at four times. "I could seethe hand of a foreign government", he says.</p><p>In July 2007, Chávez sacked Baduel as defenceminister. Relations between the two had long soured: "In 2005, I began toperceive deviations in the project that began under the <em>Samán de Güere</em>." Baduel's tone deepens as he finds words toexpress the abomination. "It became ever clearer that we were facing aproject called 'socialism of the 21st century', which was never properly defined,which was only the repetition of basic slogans empty of content, and which wasaimed at sustaining the <em>única ypersonalísima</em> (nothing but the personal) ambition of President Chávez tobecome life-president of a Venezuela that grows ever poorer."</p><p>Chávez, having been saved from theopposition's battering-rams, has arguably transformed empathy with the poorinto self-identification with the <a href=""http://www.economist.com/world/americas/displaystory.cfm?story_id=12607297">people</a>," and finally into conviction that he himself incarnatesthe general will - that his next caprice is in fact history's iron law. It isnot that simple, of course; while Fidel Castro once represented himself as akind of host of the <a href="http://www.opendemocracy.net/xml/rss/home/index.xml/"/globalization/castro_3855.jsp">Cubans'</a>" will, Chávez sings, coddles and back-slaps.He is funny. But his absolute power is also lonely, paranoid, and <a href=""http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,591712,00.html">surrounded</a>" by an echo-chamber of sycophants.</p><p>For <a href=""http://www.analitica.com/colaboradores/3316650.asp">Agustín" Blanco Muñoz</a>, the political scientist who interviewedChávez on many occasions in the 1990s, the circle around Chávez has boiled downto half a dozen figures. These include powerful leaders and minister, such asMiranda state governor Diosdado Cabello, finance minister Ali Rodríguez andformer vice-president José Vicente Rangel; some, such as Rodríguez, thelynchpin of victory over the general strike in 2002-o3, are brilliant strategicminds. But these are working partners, not the whisperers in Chávez's ears.</p><p>The story of his intimate allies, on the otherhand, is one of betrayal. Of the three fellow soldiers at the oath-taking of <em>Samán de Güere</em>, one is dead and theother two are turncoats. <a href=""http://buscador.eluniversal.com/2008/02/01/pol_art_hombres-y-proyectos_693318.shtml">Luis" Miquilena</a>, former head of the constituent assembly in1999, recently warned that Chávez is "loyal to the traditions justifyingtotalitarian dictatorship." According to the most respected <a href=""http://www.randomhouse.com/catalog/display.pperl/9780307391681.html">biography</a>" of the president, dozens of friends andallies have turned away, citing their exasperation at Chávez's thirst for power.</p><p><strong>Creating a"new man"</strong></p><p>Yet it is Venezuela's political moment thathas made Chávez into such a towering figure of the regime. The collapse of theopposition and of intermediate democratic institutions, the vertiginouscircuits of community-to-president communication, and the establishment of anamorphous mass movement - processes that the president has followed as well aspushed - have created a huge gap between leader and followers. Into this space,no powerful dissident can last for long: there is no platform, no institution,and most importantly, no independent source of resources that is not derivedfrom the <a href="http://www.opendemocracy.net/xml/rss/home/index.xml/"/democracy-protest/venezuela_oil_3580.jsp">oil" state</a> (see "<a href="http://www.opendemocracy.net/xml/rss/home/index.xml/"/democracy-protest/venezuela_3255.jsp"><u>Venezuela:" arevolution in contraflow</u></a>",10 February 2006)</p><p>Díaz Rangel's observations in this respect aretelling. The call to debate made by Chávez fell flat on its face, but notbecause a paranoid president snuffed out the effort. "Ideologicaldifferences exist, but they are not discussed. Why? Because the centre isChávez, and it's impossible to chafe the president due to the enormous powerthat he has compared to everyone else."</p><p>Instead, the factions within <em>chavismo</em> prefer to battle for theirshare of the petroleum pie. Here, the disputes can be vicious even as theircontent is threadbare. Thus Venezuela, supposedly a "low-intensitydemocracy" or "quasi-dictatorship", is fielding over 8,000candidates in the coming elections, from 786 political groupings. "This isnot an election", quips Blanco Muñoz, "it's an electoralbender."</p><p>Half an hour through clogged traffic from thecentral bank, a virulent form of internal criticism can nevertheless be found.On the inclines of Sarria, a lower-middle-class suburb of mechanics and thickbundles of hanging cable, discontent with food shortages or crime has mutatedinto doctrinal purity. The demand is not for a new government, but a "newman".</p><p>In a roomy house next to a petrol station,Concepción Alzuru and colleagues in <a href=""http://www.radionegroprimero.org.ve/"><em>Radio" Libre Negro Primero</em></a>, one of 270 community stations across thecountry, work to animate the revolution by covering the activities of dozens ofcommunity councils and party battalions. Tall and serene, Alzuru is somethingof a star: his fluid and utterly confident diagnosis brooks no half-measures."What we have here is 100% democracy," he says. "That said,there are people who are not revolutionaries but who live from the revolution.The next step will involve everyone becoming less egocentric. In many ways,this government has been too subtle."</p><p><strong>Shaking up thestate</strong></p><p>The gap between the realities of state and thedemands of the base has grown unerringly large. At their juncture, Chávez hasrevelled in his political <a href=""http://www.versobooks.com/books/ghij/g-titles/gott_hugo_chavez.shtml">mastery</a>," while finding it increasing hard to satisfyboth elements: that of a patronage-dependent, ineffective state and politicalstructure, of the sort that sends Argentine bonds into a spin, and that of aradicalised and expectant base.</p><p>For Blanco Muñoz, the new solution to this,the essential structural dilemma of <em>chavismo</em>,is now being tested: "state capitalism". "The idea is to have astrong state, but give it an inverse meaning by putting wealth in the hands ofthe majority. But we know what this means - the creation of an enormous bureaucracythat simply becomes the new structure of privilege."</p><p>The emergence of this class - of bond-brokers,state contractors, governors and <a href=""http://www.coha.org/2008/09/venezuela%25E2%2580%2599s-military-in-the-hugo-chavez-era/">military</a>" officers - is already well advanced. Sinceearly 2007, reams of evidence pointing to the historical failure of thecorporate state in Venezuela have been ignored, no more so than in the takeoverof Santander bank's local subsidiary (<a href=""http://english.eluniversal.com/2008/08/01/en_ing_art_president-chavez-to_01A1867079.shtml">announced</a>" on 31 July 2008), which lifted the Venezuelanstate's presence in the banking sector to over 20% without any particularrenewal of interest in oversight. </p><p>As <a href=""http://blogs.salon.com/0001330/2005/03/31.html%23a2189">Víctor" Salmerón</a>, economic editor of the national daily <a href=""http://www.eluniversal.com/index.shtml"><em>El" Universal</em></a> observes, the path towards public ownedbanking has already been trodden: seven of them collapsed between 1960 and1993. "The only bank in the country which is making losses at the momentis the state-owned Banco Industrial de Venezuela", he says. "Butthen, these banks are handled according to political criteria. If you want tofinance land reform in Barinas state, then that's where you'll find themoney."</p><p>Within the state, the experience of workingunder <a href=""http://www.waterstones.com/waterstonesweb/displayProductDetails.do?sku=6026343">President" Chávez</a> is likewise that of sudden, spasmodic change- of the same battle between dependence on and impatience with the existingmachinery. In the foreign ministry, where the breach between the inheritedpro-Washington diplomatic corps and the new anti-imperial, Bolivarian missionis evidently vast, agitation is constant (see Julia Buxton, "<a href="http://www.opendemocracy.net/xml/rss/home/index.xml/"/article/hugo-chavez-and-venezuela-questions-of-leadership">Hugo" Chávez and Venezuela:questions of leadership</a>", 21 November 2008). </p><p>One senior adviser to foreign minister <a href=""http://www.venezuelaonu.gob.ve/canciller.php">Nicolás" Maduro</a>,a member of Chávez's close circle, admits he is exhausted: apparently thepresident is fond of reading official documents at night and demanding instantaction. "His priority is politics over economics. As a result, politicalactivity overwhelms our technical capacity - we have to create new structuresto respond to new needs as we go, whether it is with <a href=""http://www.comunidadandina.org/sudamerica.htm">Unasur</a>[The" South American Union] or <a href=""http://iiicumbrepetrocaribe.menpet.gob.ve/index.php?tpl=interface.en/design/Union_Energetica/Petroamerica/PetroCaribe/Intro.html">Petrocaribe</a>" [the oil aid programme for the Caribbean,estimated to be worth $2 billion in 2007]".</p><p>"As the Cubans say, structural changesproduce areas of anarchy", he adds. "Of course, the difference inCuba was that they could use their weapons."</p><p><strong>The new opposition</strong></p><p>When everything is political and the Jacobinfaction dominates, the historian of the French revolution <a href=""http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/book.asp?ref=9780631198086&site=1">François" Furet</a> observed, enemies are always waiting."Like mythological thought, the objective universe is invested withsubjective wills, which means culprits and scapegoats."</p><p>The Venezuelan opposition has long served asthe culprit and the scapegoat, the local branch of empire and the enemy within.It is of course the class-based polarisation generated by the opposition in thecoup and general strike of 2002 and 2003 that has enabled all criticism to betreated as a conspiracy to subvert the government. Since those days, however, <em>chavismo</em> has seized control of all stateinstitutions, and the opposition has reached in defence for Chávez's own <a href=""http://pdba.georgetown.edu/Constitutions/Venezuela/venezuela.html">constitution</a>" (adopted in December 1999).</p><p>A diminutive blue version of this document isbrandished ferociously by <a href=""http://www.as-coa.org/article.php?id=1283">Leopoldo" López</a>,mayor of the Caracas suburb of Chacao. One of the 270 candidates barred fromrunning for public office for nine years - in his case on a corruption chargedating from 1997 that has never reached a court of law - this 37-year-oldstalks the mayor's office with a rabid grimace. <a href=""http://www.chacao.gov.ve/alcalde/">Photogenic</a>," dynamic andextraordinarily nimble in his convictions, López is apparently the country'smost popular politician, a fact that may have influenced thecomptroller-general's ruling.</p><p>For López, the constitution is the lodestonefor Venezuela's future. Like many citizens, he wishes the revolution would stopthere. "The problem is not with the new institutions, but with theappalling execution of policy, the corruption, the lack of balance between thepublic powers..... Only when three things occur will the institutionalscaffolding work: when it is depoliticised, demilitarised and stripped ofideology."</p><p>The growing body of the new opposition rightly<a href=""http://www.miamiherald.com/news/americas/story/781289.html">scents</a>" that here, in the middle ground of thosesupporting the <em>chavista</em> impulse butdisregarding its manic excesses, lies the way back to government. Baduel, forhis part, is not standing in this poll, but seemingly remains ready for the greatpresidential contest in 2012, with a similar message of balanced government andthe armed forces as his key backers. "No less than 80% of the men andwomen in the armed forces are increasingly concerned over where the institutionis going", he insists. On his table three prominent books illuminate thecompass of his thinking: a tome on social policy, a homage to Bolívar and JamesRedfield's new-age humdinger, <em>TheCelestine Prophec</em>y.</p><p>Should Chávez lose six or seven of thetwenty-two provinces being contested in the 23 November election, he will findhimself faced with a <a href=""http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/toughtalking-chavez-faces-rising-dissent-1026325.html">reinvigorated</a>" opposition at a time of dwindling oilrevenues. Although he has pledged to order the tanks onto the streets and <a href=""http://www.iht.com/articles/ap/2008/11/19/news/LT-Venezuela-Intimidation.php">crush</a>" the political intruders, enlightened <em>chavistas</em> are hopeful that he may usethe opportunity to cultivate the very same middle ground. "A period willbegin in which all political actors will have to show their maturity",argues an optimistic Monedero. "The opposition will have to show they aresincere in terms of their promise to defend the constitution. And <em>chavismo</em>, for its part, will be obligedto open up to more internal debate."</p><p>In short, the first conflict-ridden decade will be over, and theconstruction of a new political identity in Venezuela complete. Oralternatively, the militarisation of the movement that began in 2005, and hasspread arms to the community base through the national reserve and othermilitias along with a rhetoric of violent class antagonism, could be called onto meet its manifest destiny. It would be an act of the most extreme folly, thespasm of an expiring presidency, and the result of a terrible dearth of soundadvice. In short, it will be the test of the central unresolved conundrum ofthe president's rule: is it the man or the movement that is in charge?</p><div class="rating-item"><div class="rating" id="rating_mean_46836"><div class="rating-intro"><span class="rating-intro-text">Average rating</span></div><div class="star avg on"><a style="width: 100%;" onclick="return false;"> </a></div><div class="star avg on"><a style="width: 100%;" onclick="return false;"> </a></div><div class="star avg on"><a style="width: 100%;" onclick="return false;"> </a></div><div class="star avg on"><a style="width: 100%;" onclick="return false;"> </a></div><div class="star avg on"><a style="width: 100%;" onclick="return false;"> </a></div><div class="num-votes">(<span id="rating_num_votes_46836">1</span> vote)</div></div><form action="/xml/rss/home/index.xml?" method="post" id="rating_form_46836" class="rating" title="Rating: 0.0"><div><div class="form-item"> <label for="rating_options_46836">Rate this: </label> <select name="edit[rating]" class="form-select rating-options" title="Rate this" id="rating_options_46836" ><option value="0" selected="selected">---</option><option value="100">Excellent!</option><option value="80">Great!</option><option value="60">Good</option><option value="40">Quite good</option><option value="20">Not so great</option></select></div><input type="hidden" name="edit[nid]" id="edit-nid" value="46836" /><input type="submit" name="op" value="Submit" class="form-submit" /><input type="hidden" name="edit[form_id]" id="edit-rating-form-46836" value="rating_form_46836" /></div></form></div> http://www.opendemocracy.net/article/venezuela-troops-polls-and-an-itch-at-the-top#comment email latin america democracy & power Creative Commons normal globalisation institutions & government Ivan Briscoe politics of protest Fri, 21 Nov 2008 15:38:40 +0000 46836 at http://www.opendemocracy.net Iraq’s gift to Afghanistan, Paul Rogers http://www.opendemocracy.net/article/iraq-s-gift-to-afghanistan <p>In mid-November 2001, a little over sevenyears ago, the war to terminate the Taliban regime in Afghanistan was nearingits end. The Taliban militias had <a href=""http://www.pbs.org/newshour/extra/features/july-dec01/kabul_11-14.html">vacated</a>" Kabul almost overnight and most of them weredispersing across the south and east of the country, as well as across theborder into western Pakistan.</p><p class="pullquote_new"><br />Paul Rogers is professor of peace studies at Bradford University,northern England. He has been writing a weekly <a href="http://www.opendemocracy.net/xml/rss/home/index.xml/"/author/Paul_Rogers.jsp"><u>column</u></a>" on global security on <strong>openDemocracy</strong> since 26 September 2001<br /></p><p>The George W Bush administration was, only twomonths after the 9/11 atrocities, on the brink of claiming its first scalp inthe "war on terror". Even at that stage, as a number of columns in this <a href="http://www.opendemocracy.net/xml/rss/home/index.xml/"/taxonomy/term/191">series</a>noted," attention was already turning to the regime that had really been in thesights since Bush came to office: Saddam Hussein's Iraq (see "<a href="http://www.opendemocracy.net/xml/rss/home/index.xml/"/conflict/article_233.jsp">From" Afghanistan to Iraq?</a>", 14 October 2001). </p><p>But if the Afghan campaign witnessed whatseemed to be a lightning victory, the failure to killor capture al-Qaida's leader Osama bin Laden and the Taliban <a href=""http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/1657368.stm">figurehead</a>" Mullah Mohammad Omar left a bitter taste. It is worth recallingthat these were "public enemies one and two", meaning that Mullah Omar <a href=""http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/northamerica/usa/barackobama/3483479/Al-Qaeda-leader-racially-abuses-Barack-Obama.html">at" the time</a> far exceeded bin Laden's own deputy, Aymanal-Zawahiri, in importance. It may be largely forgotten today, when theEgyptian ideologist offers the western media rich pickings for his propaganda <a href=""http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/northamerica/usa/barackobama/3483479/Al-Qaeda-leader-racially-abuses-Barack-Obama.html">statements</a>," but in late 2001 and for some time afterMullah Omar was the person most wanted for leading the Taliban and shelteringal-Qaida. </p><p>This is especially relevant in the week that <a href=""http://geology.com/world/afghanistan-satellite-image.shtml">Afghanistan's</a>" president, Hamid Karzai, has <a href=""http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1859576,00.html">offered</a>" Mullah Omar safe conduct and protection if heagrees to engage in negotiations to help bring the bitter war to an end (seeCandace Rondeaux, "<a href=""http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/11/16/AR2008111600899.html?hpid=moreheadlines">Karzai" Makes Offer to Taliban</a>", <em>WashingtonPost</em>, 17 November 2008). The suggestion of dialogue with Taliban elementsis not in itself radical: some talks are reported already to be underway onboth sides of the border with (it is assumed) what are termed"moderates" in the broad and <a href=""http://www.e-ariana.com/ariana/eariana.nsf/allDocs/47441BFBAC68FBE987257506006621CB?OpenDocument">dispersed</a>" coalition of militias and paramilitaries. Indeed, such initiatives have been a regular backdrop to difficult times in the Afghan campaign (seeSyed Saleem Shahzad, "<a href=""http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Central_Asia/GK22Ag02.html">Time" to talk: US engages theTaliban</a>", <em>Asia Times</em>, 22 November 2005). </p><p>The most remarkable thing about Karzai'soutreach, though, is that it should have been made to Mullah Omar himself. Thepresident's fragile position as the head of an increasingly unpopularadministration that is mired in corruption and mismanagement helps explain it.But it is also a sign of wider Afghan concern at the increasing levels ofinsecurity, especially the upsurge in attacks on Nato's supply-routes fromPakistan which bring in three-quarters of all the supplies for the 67,000foreign troops in the country.</p><p class="pullquote_new"><br />In addition to his weekly <strong>openDemocracy</strong>column, Paul Rogers writes an international security monthly briefing for theOxford Research Group; for details, click <a href=""http://www.oxfordresearchgroup.org.uk/paulrogers.htm">here</a><br" /><br />Paul Rogers's most recent book is <a href=""http://www.polity.co.uk/book.asp?ref=9780745641966"><em><u>Why" We're Losing the War on Terror</u></em></a> (Polity, 2007) - an analysis of thestrategic misjudgments of the post-9/11 era and why a new security paradigm isneeded<br /><br /></p><p>Several columns in this series have alreadynoted this neglected aspect of the war (see "<a href="http://www.opendemocracy.net/xml/rss/home/index.xml/"/article/the-global-economic-war">The" global economic war</a>", 14 August 2008). In March 2008, forexample, more than forty Nato tankers were <a href=""http://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/24/world/asia/24afgan.html?ref=world">destroyed</a>" in a Taliban attack; soon afterwards,military-helicopter engines valued at around $13 million were taken in anotherraid. More recently, the situation has become even more <a href=""http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/wire/sns-ap-as-pakistan-afghan-supply-line,1,5429331.story">critical</a>." There has been a backlog of over 1,000trucks waiting on the Pakistani side of the border, following a series ofwell-planned attacks on convoys (see Candace Rondeaux & Walter Pincus,"<a href=""http://candace%20rondeaux%20&%20walter%20pincus,%20%22u.s.%20seeks%20new%20supply%20routes%20into%20afghanistan%22,%20washington%20post/">U.S." Seeks New Supply Routesinto Afghanistan</a>", <em>Washington Post</em>, 19 November 2008). </p><p>The incoming Barack Obama administration is well-nighcertain to <a href=""http://www.rferl.org/content/Adviser_Says_Obama_Will_Undertake_Fresh_Start_in_Afghanistan_Pakistan/1339853.html">maintain</a>" current forces in Afghanistan, and indeed willprobably increase them by more than 10,000. Britain is <a href=""http://www.afghanistannewscenter.com/news/2008/november/nov202008.html%234">planning</a>" to put another 2,000 troops into the countryand is also intending to redeploy its Merlin helicopters from southern Iraq toreinforce the limited numbers of helicopters currently in Afghanistan. </p><p><strong>A slow entrapment</strong></p><p>The implication of these trends is that thewar in Afghanistan looks set to escalate, in ways that are already puttingpressure on leading politicians and military <a href=""http://www.federalnewsradio.com/?nid=82&sid=1512090">strategists</a>" to seek fresh ideas. Iraq still hassignificance, however, in the overall thinking and direction of the al-Qaidamovement. </p><p>Iraq's key role can be explained by referenceto the attacks of 11 September 2001, which were to have such devastatingconsequences for the country. The motives of the 9/11 operationincluded attempting to lure the United States, the "<a href=""http://www.cambridge.org/us/catalogue/catalogue.asp?isbn=0521791405">far" enemy</a>", into Afghanistan. The idea was that the USwould experience the same fate in the country as had the Soviet Union in the1980s - embroiled in a long, unwinnable war that exerted a heavy toll of casualtiesand end in the humiliating retreat of a superpower. The war would also providea new cadre of <em>jihadist</em>paramilitaries with valuable combat experience against modern armed forces. </p><p>The United States did not immediately fallinto the trap. Instead, it used a combination of overwhelming airpower, specialforces and the comprehensive rearming of the Northern Alliance warlords to oustthe Taliban. Yet since the appearance of early and quick success, the US andits allies have indeed been gradually inveigled into a costly war against anelusive enemy. Along the way, Iraq hasprovided an astonishingly destructive diversion - in three respects:</p><p>* it has forced the US military into a hugerefocusing that has both drawn attention away from Afghanistan and made iteasier for the Taliban/al-Qaida nexus to re-establish itself</p><p>* the massive civilian casualties anddestruction in Iraq galvanised support for al-Qaida, not least with the assaulton Fallujah (the "city of mosques") in November 2004 - which was seenin much of the Muslim world as akin to an Islamic 9/11 (see Scilla Elworthy, "<a href="http://www.opendemocracy.net/xml/rss/home/index.xml/"/conflict-iraq/fallujah_2999.jsp">Learning" from Fallujah's agony</a>", 7 November 2005)</p><p>* the five years of war in Iraq have givenrise to a cohort of young combat-trained <em>jihadist</em>paramilitaries. There are now some thousands of them spread across northAfrica, the middle east and west Asia. They represent a new generation, theequivalent of the sons of those who fought against the Soviets in the 1980s.But they have the added advantage of having trained themselves not againstdisillusioned Soviet conscripts in a scratchy rural Afghan environment, butagainst the world's best-equipped professional armed forces, the US army andmarine corps, in a primarily urban milieu (see John F Burns, "<a href=""http://www.iht.com/articles/2008/10/14/asia/afghan.php">As" Iraq cools, rebels go toAfghanistan</a>", International HeraldTribune, 14 October 2008). </p><p><strong>A new generation</strong></p><p>It now looks, pending a vote in the Iraqiparliament, as though the status-of-forces agreement (Sofa) <a href=""http://english.aljazeera.net/news/middleeast/2008/11/2008111717249403775.html">signed</a>" on 17 November 2008 will be completed betweenthe United States military in Iraq and the <a href=""http://www.rferl.org/Content/Iraq_PM_Says_Pacts_Critics_Want_US_Troops_To_Stay/1350628.html">Nouri" al-Maliki</a> administration. If implemented, this couldlead to the withdrawal of all US combat forces from Iraq by the end of 2011(though other elements could remain). A degree of conflict in Iraq might in anyevent persist, but such an outcome would involve the focus of the war on terrormoving nearly 1,500 kilometres eastwards to Afghanistan. </p><p>That, to the al-Qaida strategists, iseminently satisfying. Their original expectation was of a slow and steadybuild-up to a guerrilla war in Afghanistan that would stretch over at least adecade. What they got instead was a diversion into a long war in the heart ofthe middle east that increased worldwide support for their movement and infused them with thousands of dedicated paramilitaries (see "<a href="http://www.opendemocracy.net/xml/rss/home/index.xml/"/article/afghanistan-the-edge-of-calamity">Afghanistan:" on the cliff-edge</a>", 28 August 2008).</p><p>How that will play out over the next twodecades is impossible to say. It is clear that many of the insurgency methodsdeveloped in Iraq have been introduced into Afghanistan and Pakistan toconsiderable effect. There is also evidence that paramilitaries from a numberof countries are now aiding the rapid Islamist <a href=""http://www.mcclatchydc.com/homepage/story/56097.html">resurgence</a>" in Somalia, which may see the collapse of thecurrent weak government in Mogadishu in weeks rather than months. </p><p>Beyond that, all is speculation at this stage.All that can be concluded for now is that Iraq has already served its purpose.Even if Iraq does achieve the near impossible and make some sort of transitionto a more peaceful country, the war has already had its value for the al-Qaidamovement. </p><p>In January 2000, during an early phase of thecampaign for the presidential election in November that year, George W Bushdescribed the post-cold-war environment in his <a href=""http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/03/20010330-1.html">inimitable</a>" style:</p><p>"...it was a dangerous world and we knewexactly who they 'they' were. It was us versus them and we knew exactly whothem was. Today we're not so sure who the 'they' are, but we know they'rethere." </p><p>One of the enduring achievements of hispresidency is that there are now a lot more of "them" there. </p><div class="rating-item"><div class="rating" id="rating_mean_46834"><div class="rating-intro"><span class="rating-intro-text">Average rating</span></div><div class="star avg on"><a style="width: 100%;" onclick="return false;"> </a></div><div class="star avg on"><a style="width: 100%;" onclick="return false;"> </a></div><div class="star avg on"><a style="width: 100%;" onclick="return false;"> </a></div><div class="star avg on"><a style="width: 100%;" onclick="return false;"> </a></div><div class="star avg"><a style="width: 100%;" onclick="return false;"> </a></div><div class="num-votes">(<span id="rating_num_votes_46834">1</span> vote)</div></div><form action="/xml/rss/home/index.xml?" method="post" id="rating_form_46834" class="rating" title="Rating: 4.0"><div><div class="form-item"> <label for="rating_options_46834">Rate this: </label> <select name="edit[rating]" class="form-select rating-options" title="Rate this" id="rating_options_46834" ><option value="0">---</option><option value="100">Excellent!</option><option value="80" selected="selected">Great!</option><option value="60">Good</option><option value="40">Quite good</option><option value="20">Not so great</option></select></div><input type="hidden" name="edit[nid]" id="edit-nid" value="46834" /><input type="submit" name="op" value="Submit" class="form-submit" /><input type="hidden" name="edit[form_id]" id="edit-rating-form-46834" value="rating_form_46834" /></div></form></div> http://www.opendemocracy.net/article/iraq-s-gift-to-afghanistan#comment email Creative Commons normal global security globalisation Paul Rogers Syndicate-750 Thu, 20 Nov 2008 17:26:30 +0000 46834 at http://www.opendemocracy.net Georgia and Russia: the aftermath , Donald Rayfield http://www.opendemocracy.net/article/georgia-and-russia-the-aftermath <p>The Georgia-Russia war of 8-12 August 2008 has left a host of issues unresolved. The future of the contested territories of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, the resettlement of the expelled and displaced, the fate of Georgia's aspiration to join Nato, and the ambitions of an emboldened Russia are just a few. The bitter fallout of a vicious conflict means that it will be some time before the longer-term impact of the war in these and other areas will become clear. </p><p><span class="pullquote_new">Donald Rayfield is emeritus <a href=""http://www.sllf.qmul.ac.uk/staff/rayfield.html">professor</a>" of Russian in the School of Modern Languages, Queen Mary College, University of London. <br /><br />Among his books is <a href=""http://www.randomhouse.com/catalog/display.pperl?isbn=9780375757716"><em>Stalin" and his Hangmen</em></a> (Random House, 2005). <br /><br />He is editor-in-chief of the <em>Comprehensive Georgian-English Dictionary</em> (<a href=""http://www.sllf.qmul.ac.uk/research/russian/garnett/index.html">Garnett" Press</a>, 2006), a work of 1,440,000 entries and nearly 1,800 pages in two volumes <br /><br />Also by Donald Rayfield in <strong>openDemocracy</strong>: <br /><br />"<a href="http://www.opendemocracy.net/xml/rss/home/index.xml/"/democracy-caucasus/russia_georgia_3961.jsp">Georgia" and Russia: with you, without you</a>" (3 October 2006)<br /><br />"<a href="http://www.opendemocracy.net/xml/rss/home/index.xml/"/article/conflicts/caucasus_fractures/georgia_russia_war">Russia" vs Georgia: a war of perceptions</a>" (24 August 2007)<br /><br />"<a href="http://www.opendemocracy.net/xml/rss/home/index.xml/"/article/the-georgia-russia-conflict-lost-territory-found-nation">The" Georgia-Russia conflict: lost territory, found nation</a>" (13 August 2008</span> </p><p>It is far too early to talk of a return to normality, even were such a notion to apply to the Georgia-Russia relationship and the pre-war political situation in the region. A cautious return to diplomatic dialogue - from the European Union-Russia <a href=""http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/russia/sum11_08/index_en.htm">summit</a>" in Nice on 14 November (which emerged with a <a href="http://www.opendemocracy.net/xml/rss/home/index.xml/"/article/after-the-war-recognising-reality-in-abkhazia-and-georgia">proposal" </a>for a new "security architecture" in Europe) to the resumption of <a href=""http://www.messenger.com.ge/issues/1726_november_5_2008/1726_geneva.html">talks</a>" between Moscow and Tbilisi in Geneva on 18 November - may at least offer some signals about the prospects for movement on the core tensions that the war revealed. </p><p>But in order for more substantial progress to be possible, the outstanding questions surrounding the August <a href=""http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/in_depth/europe/2008/georgia_russia_conflict/default.stm">conflict</a>" itself - how it began, who is to blame, and what are the implications of answers to these questions - must also be faced. These continue to be matters of intense dispute, in an atmosphere overlain by politically-driven public-relations campaigns on all sides. What follows is an assessment based on current knowledge about the circumstances of the war and its possible consequences, which builds on earlier contributions in <strong>openDemocracy</strong> (see, for example, "<a href="http://www.opendemocracy.net/xml/rss/home/index.xml/"/article/conflicts/caucasus_fractures/georgia_russia_war">Russia" vs Georgia: a war of perception</a>s" [24 August 2007], and "<a href="http://www.opendemocracy.net/xml/rss/home/index.xml/"/article/the-georgia-russia-conflict-lost-territory-found-nation">The" Georgia-Russia conflict: lost territory, found nation</a>" [13 August 2008]). </p><p><strong>A chain of responsibility</strong> </p><p>It is famously said that truth is the first casualty of war. In this case, however - thanks to the careful work and independent research of journalists and other observers - it can also be the first to recover from its injuries. </p><p>Seven points can be made about the circumstances of the war: </p><p>The first is that the full-scale <a href=""http://www.rferl.org/content/Eyewitness_Accounts_Confirm_Shelling_Of_Georgian_Villages/1349256.html">attack</a>" by Georgian forces on South Ossetia's capital Tskhinvali on the night of 7-8 August 2008 - involving indiscriminate artillery-fire from Grad rockets - was not provoked by any Ossetian forces' shelling of Georgian villages in the enclave. A number of sources - including three observers from the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (<a href=""http://www.osce.org/georgia/33133.html">OSCE</a>)," of whom only one was from the former Soviet Union, and two experienced British military observers in the area at the time - report that there was no immediate provocation that would justify the Georgian escalation of what had <a href=""http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=1250&l=1">hitherto</a>" been a low-key conflict. This conclusion is supported too by the evidence of a number of Georgian inhabitants of South Ossetia, and has been reinforced by the findings of the journalist Tim Whewell in <a href=""http://www.bbc.co.uk/worldservice/news/2008/10/081023_georgia_len.shtml">meticulous</a>" reports featured on the BBC World Service and other outlets. </p><p>Moreover, reports of Russian forces making their way through the Roki tunnel into South Ossetia on 7 August (rather than 8 August) are not backed up by any satellite or other confirmed intelligence. The conclusion must be that blame for the death of over 100 Ossetian civilians and Russian "peacekeepers" in the Georgian assault belongs to Georgia's president, <a href=""http://www.president.gov.ge/?l=E&m=1&sm=3">Mikheil" Saakashvili</a>, and his military commanders; and Saakashvili, even if he has convinced himself of the truth of his version of events, needs to be confronted with the disparities between his allegations and the verifiable facts. </p><p>The second point is that it would however be quite wrong to follow Russia's president and prime minister, <a href=""http://www.kremlin.ru/eng/">Dmitri" Medvedev</a> and Vladimir Putin (and their western acolytes such as Silvio Berlusconi) in blaming Saakashvili, his army and their United States advisers for initiating the war. </p><p><span class="pullquote_new">Among <strong>openDemocracy's </strong>recent<strong> </strong>articles on Georgian politics, including the war with Russia in August 2008:<br /><br />Robert Parsons, "<a href="http://www.opendemocracy.net/xml/rss/home/index.xml/"/article/georgia-abkhazia-russia-the-war-option">Georgia," Abkhazia, Russia: the war option</a>" (13 May 2008)<br /><br />Thomas de Waal, "<a href="http://www.opendemocracy.net/xml/rss/home/index.xml/"/article/caucasus_fractures/the-russia-georgia-tinderbox">The" Russia-Georgia tinderbox</a>" (16 May 2008)<br /><br />Alexander Rondeli, "<a href="http://www.opendemocracy.net/xml/rss/home/index.xml/"/article/georgia-s-search-for-coexistence">Georgia's" search for itself</a>" (8 July 2008)<br /><br />Thomas de Waal, "<a href="http://www.opendemocracy.net/xml/rss/home/index.xml/"/article/south-ossetia-the-avoidable-tragedy">South" Ossetia: the avoidable tragedy</a>" (11 August 2008)<br /><br />Ghia Nodia, "<a href="http://www.opendemocracy.net/xml/rss/home/index.xml/"/article/georgia-under-fire-the-power-of-russian-resentment">The" war for Georgia: Russia, the west, the future</a>" (12 August 2008)<br /><br />Neal Ascherson, "<a href="http://www.opendemocracy.net/xml/rss/home/index.xml/"/article/after-the-war-recognising-reality-in-abkhazia-and-georgia">After" the war: recognising reality in Abkhazia and Georgia</a>" (15 August 2008)<br /><br />George Hewitt, "<a href="http://www.opendemocracy.net/xml/rss/home/index.xml/"/article/abkhazia-and-south-ossetia-heart-of-conflict-key-to-solution">Abkhazia" and South Ossetia: heart of conflict, key to solution</a>" (18 August 2008)<br /><br />Ivan Krastev, "<a href="http://www.opendemocracy.net/xml/rss/home/index.xml/"/article/russia-and-the-georgia-war-the-great-power-trap">Russia" and the Georgia war: the great-power trap</a>" (19 August 2008)<br /><br />Paul Rogers, "<a href="http://www.opendemocracy.net/xml/rss/home/index.xml/"/article/russia-and-iran-rise-of-the-rest-crisis-of-the-west">Russia" and Iran: crisis of the west, rise of the rest</a>" (21 August 2008)<br /><br />Ghia Nodia, "<a href="http://www.opendemocracy.net/xml/rss/home/index.xml/"/article/russian-war-and-georgian-democracy">Russian" war and Georgian democracy</a>" (22 August 2008)<br /><br />Robert Parsons, "<a href="http://www.opendemocracy.net/xml/rss/home/index.xml/"/article/georgia-after-war-the-political-landscape">Georgia" after war: the political landscape</a>" (26 August 2008)<br /><br />Mary Kaldor, "<a href="http://www.opendemocracy.net/xml/rss/home/index.xml/"/article/sovereignty-status-and-the-humanitarian-perspective">Sovereignty," status and the humanitarian perspective</a>" (26 August 2008)<br /><br />Vicken Cheterian, "<a href="http://www.opendemocracy.net/xml/rss/home/index.xml/"/article/georgia-the-rose-revolution-s-forgotten-legacy">Georgia's" forgotten legacy</a>" (3 September 2008)<br /><br />Martin Shaw, "<a href="http://www.opendemocracy.net/xml/rss/home/index.xml/"/article/after-the-georgia-war-the-challenge-to-citizen-action">After" the Georgia war: the challenge to citizen action</a>" (22 September 2008)<br /><br />Katinka Barysch, "E<a href="http://www.opendemocracy.net/xml/rss/home/index.xml/"/article/europe-and-the-georgia-russia-conflict">urope" and the Georgia-Russia conflict</a>" (30 September 2008)<br /><br />Robert Parsons, "<a href="http://www.opendemocracy.net/xml/rss/home/index.xml/"/article/georgia-the-politics-of-recovery">Georgia:" the politics of recovery</a>" (24 October 2008) <br /><br />Plus: <a href="http://www.opendemocracy.net/xml/rss/home/index.xml/"/russia">openDemocracy's" Russia section</a> reports, debates and blogs the Georgia war.</span>True, Russian forces may have taken no special action on or just before 7-8 August to justify the Georgian army's attack on Tskhinvali. But Russian forces were clearly prepared for and expecting such a conflict: their armies were in place in North Ossetia, their battleships were ready to reach Georgian ports within a day or two; the Ossetians, whose government and armed forces are effectively controlled by Russians, had for several weeks escalated the usual petty violence of kidnappings, shootings, blockades and banditry to a point where the death-rate among Georgian police was more than worrying. Saakashvili's attack, if it can be justified at all, can be called a pre-emptive strike. </p><p>The third point is that the Georgian army had at least 130 American <a href=""http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/russo_georgian_war_and_balance_power">advisers</a>" who answer to the US authorities. It is difficult to believe that the move north from Tbilisi of the most heavily armed, motorised forces of the Georgian army went unnoticed by these Americans. Did they remonstrate; and if not, why not? Worse, did they, as Putin alleges, actively encourage the Georgians out of cynical curiosity to see how the Russians would respond - or out of even more cynical political calculation in seeking to boost <a href=""http://www.newsweek.com/id/160069">John" McCain's</a> election chances? The answers to these questions will eventually leak out, whether from Tbilisi or from the Langley (Virginia) headquarters of the CIA. </p><p>The fourth point is that the Russian army could not have failed to repel the Georgian attack, even if it were to keep to its fiction of being merely a "peacekeeping" force. But it must be blamed for its actions in two areas: </p><p>* deliberately destroying Georgian infrastructure and severely damaging the economy by cutting the only <a href=""http://go.hrw.com/atlas/norm_htm/georgrep.htm">east-west</a>" railway line and the only motorable east-west road, and bombing near enough the airport to deter commercial aircraft from landing at Tbilisi </p><p>* embarking on an orgy of <a href="http://www.opendemocracy.net/xml/rss/home/index.xml/"/Russia/article/South-Ossetia-Tskhinvali-Apocalypse">looting</a>" and allowing Ossetian and Chechen "irregulars" (a more polite word than they deserve) to steal, rape, kill and drive out Georgian villagers from South Ossetia (see Tanya Lokshina, "<a href="http://www.opendemocracy.net/xml/rss/home/index.xml/"/Russia/article/a-month-after-the-war">A" month after the war</a>", 16 September 2008). </p><p>The background of Chechen hatred for Georgians (which reached its height in 1944 when Stalin used Georgian detachments of the NKVD to <a href=""http://www.watchdog.cz/index.php?show=000000-000015-000006-000030&lang=1">deport</a>" the entire Chechen nation to central Asia) makes it as as cruel a decision to use Chechen forces in South Ossetia as it was to let them fight with the Abkhaz against the Georgians in 1992. </p><p>The fifth point is that the Russians are guilty of the sheer hypocrisy of pretending to be neutral peacekeepers in the region, when since 1992-93 they have been seeking gradually to integrate both South Ossetia and Abkhazia into the Russian Federation by a variety of means: common currencies, introducing pension and healthcare rights, issuing Russian-citizenship passports to the inhabitants. </p><p>The Georgians may have been originally to blame for their cavalier treatment of <a href=""http://www.conflicts.rem33.com/images/Georgia/Fowkes.htm">Abkhaz</a>" and Ossetian nationalism in the 1989-92 period, but in <a href=""http://www.georgianbiography.com/history10.html">later" years</a> have watched with increasing frustration at seeing their country dismembered while the outside world remained all but indifferent. This helps explain if not justify the <a href=""http://www.rferl.org/content/BBC_Film_Airs_Georgian_War_Crime_Claims/1336903.html">crime</a>" of shelling Tskhinvali - a crime which gave the Russians the long-awaited pretext to "recognise" the breakaway territories' independence and thus effectively <a href=""http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/7267c6b4-b124-11dd-8915-0000779fd18c.html">absorb</a>" them for good. In addition, the Russians lied even more brazenly than the Georgians in the first stages of the war, in proclaiming a "genocide" of Ossetians with as many as 2,000 victims, when the <a href=""http://articles.latimes.com/2008/aug/18/world/fg-breakaway18">verifiable" </a>total is far less. </p><p>The sixth point is that western politicians, particularly ambassadors and donors, failed in their duty to make clear to Mikheil Saakashvili - in terms that he could not pretend to misunderstand - that they would in no way support a "war of liberation" aimed at recovering the lost territories of <a href=""http://www.kafkas.org.tr/english/bgkafkas/bukaf_gosetya.html">South" Ossetia</a> and Abkhazia. Any diplomat in <a href=""http://undp.org.ge/new/index.php?lang_id=ENG&sec_id=59">Georgia</a>" soon realises that, regardless of reality and common sense, every Georgian politician has had to promise his electorate that they would meet next year in Sukhumi and Tskhinvali. The inevitable danger of such rhetoric is that at moments of despair, the irresponsible politician - whether Eduard Shevardnadze or Saakashvili himself - gambles on an attempt to turn it into reality. Georgia's economic resurgence since 2004 has depended on tranches of grants and investments which should have been absolutely conditional on conforming to basic ground-rules (see Vicken Cheterian, "<a href="http://www.opendemocracy.net/xml/rss/home/index.xml/"/article/georgia-the-rose-revolution-s-forgotten-legacy">Georgia's" forgotten legacy</a>", 3 September 2008). </p><p>The seventh point is that some western politicians made culpable errors at the outset of the war by laying total blame on Russia for its outbreak, then compounded this by <a href=""http://www.economist.com/world/europe/displaystory.cfm?story_id=12201960">reversing</a>" Theodore Roosevelt's advice and "talking hard while carrying a soft stick". They included the hapless John McCain, the leaders of the Baltic states, and two callow British politicians (<a href=""http://www.fco.gov.uk/en/newsroom/latest-news/?view=Speech&id=5619709">foreign" minister</a> David Miliband and opposition leader David Cameron). </p><p>Cameron's <a href=""http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/europe/article4547747.ece">threat</a>" to stop Russians shopping at Selfridges was clearly neutralised by a few phone- calls from west London stores, casinos, estate agents and schools who rely on the big spenders from Moscow; while Miliband's subsequent reticence is no doubt attributable to briefings on the complexities of the issues, and the political and economic price Britain would have to pay for taking a stand on principle against Russia's Machiavellian policies (see Katinka Barysch, "<a href="http://www.opendemocracy.net/xml/rss/home/index.xml/"/article/europe-and-the-georgia-russia-conflict">Europe" and the Georgia-Russia conflict</a>", 30 September 2008) </p><p><strong>The post-war situation </strong></p><p>The immediate consequences of the brief, nasty <a href=""http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/7549736.stm">war</a>" are threefold. </p><p>The first is that of all the states involved, the overall situation has substantially <a href=""http://www.economist.com/displaystory.cfm?story_id=12415100">changed</a>" only for Georgia (and to a degree the other states and regions of the south Caucasus). The damage to Tbilisi, economically and politically, is severe. Much of the destruction - of roads, installations and army bases, and the loss of housing by some 20,000 ethnic Georgians - can be compensated by the $4.55 <a href=""http://edition.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/europe/10/22/georgia.donors.ap/index.html">pledged</a>" by the United States and European Union at a conference in Brussels on 22 October 2008. But the more definitive loss of the two territories (for even to the most nationalistic Georgian politician, they must now seem irrecoverable) is less easily quantifiable or repairable. </p><p>Indeed, the permanent alienation of South Ossetia and Abkhazia could appear to be salutary, like the amputation of gangrenous limbs, but for two factors (see George Hewitt, "<a href="http://www.opendemocracy.net/xml/rss/home/index.xml/"/article/abkhazia-and-south-ossetia-heart-of-conflict-key-to-solution">Abkhazia" and South Ossetia: heart of conflict, key to solution</a>", 18 August 2008). One is that in both cases, regions inhabited by ethnic Georgians (or in the case of Abkhazia, Mingrelians, who consider themselves first cousins to Georgians) have now been cut off from Georgia. Since soon after the <a href=""http://www.c-r.org/our-work/accord/georgia-abkhazia/displacement-return.php">end</a>" of the Abkhazia <a href="http://www.opendemocracy.net/xml/rss/home/index.xml/"/democracy-caucasus/abkhazia_archive_4018.jsp">war</a>" of 1992-93, the Mingrelians of the Gali region of southern Abkhazia have been able to cross over into Georgia with minimal formalities, obstructions or violence. Now, however, the Russians are controlling the new frontier and introducing very strict controls over the bridge over the Inguri river. Thus the Mingrelians are effectively faced with the <a href=""http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav100808.shtml">choice</a>" of being imprisoned in Abkhazia as second-class citizens, or becoming homeless refugees in Georgia. </p><p>In similar fashion, two areas of South Ossetia (notably the town of Akhalgori) which were never either geographically or administratively accessible to Tskhinvali have now been <a href=""http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=19705">taken" over </a>by Russian-Ossetian forces; their Georgian inhabitants are presented with the dilemma of being aliens in their own home or <a href=""http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insightb/articles/eav111308d.shtml">refugees</a>" among their own people. </p><p>The other factor - that Russia now controls the most vital areas of Georgia - makes the situation for its southern neighbour even worse. It is a mere hour's drive from the South Ossetian frontier to Tbilisi; Georgia's capital can be shelled from Akhalgori; at any moment eastern and western Georgia can be isolated, and a strategic railway, road and <a href=""http://www.economist.com/world/europe/displaystory.cfm?story_id=11920984">pipelines</a>" cut. Georgia's energy supplies, too, are now under threat. Throughout the Abkhaz-Georgian conflict the hydroelectric generators on the Inguri river were kept working by Georgians and Abkhaz for their mutual benefit. Now, however, Abkhazia can join the Russian electricity grid, and no longer has an interest in allowing Georgia its share of this major energy source. </p><p>Moreover, investment in the <a href=""http://www.pinr.com/report.php?ac=view_report&report_id=733&language_id=1">new" railway</a> from Tbilisi to Kars in Turkey (which would in principle allow trains to travel from Baku in Azerbaijan to London - with some technical changes at the Georgian-Turkish frontier) now looks very unattractive, given the railway's new vulnerability to attack. The same is true for the Baku-Poti (on the Black Sea) or <a href="http://www.opendemocracy.net/xml/rss/home/index.xml/"/democracy-caucasus/pipeline_2763.jsp">Baku-Ceyhan</a>" (on the Mediterranean) pipelines. More and more oil importers will prefer to pay extra to use a pipeline through Russia to Novorossiisk on the Black Sea than risk transporting oil through an exposed route. </p><p>The building boom in Tbilisi and other Georgian cities, financed by foreign businesses hoping to ride on Georgian economic growth, is also facing a slowdown, if not a bust (even if the aid-pledges from the country's western backers will provide a temporary transfusion). Mikheil Saakashvili's hopes of reviving Georgian industry and agriculture - particularly viticulture, which has made enormous strides recently - are looking more <a href=""http://www.economist.com/agenda/displaystory.cfm?story_id=12536205">deflated</a>." </p><p>The war's second consequence is that it signals a transition from one era to another (see Ivan Krastev, "<a href="http://www.opendemocracy.net/xml/rss/home/index.xml/"/article/russia-and-the-georgia-war-the-great-power-trap">Russia" and the Georgia war: the great-power trap</a>", 19 August 2008). The post-cold-war period - marked at its outset by a George Bush presidency whose gratitude to Eduard Shevardnadze for helping to demolish the Soviet Union was expressed by exceptionally generous and uncritical support of Georgia, and at its end by a George W Bush presidency who showered the same support on Mikheil Saakashvili - has ended. The prospect now is of a far more sober period. There is no reason to suppose that Barack Obama will abandon Georgia, but every reason to suppose that he will attach more stringent conditions to United States <a href=""http://finchannel.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=23584&Itemid=55">backing</a>" for Georgia; and the country's roadmap towards Nato is unlikely to survive wider geopolitical considerations (see Aviel Roshwald, "<a href="http://www.opendemocracy.net/xml/rss/home/index.xml/"/article/nato-the-west-and-russia-from-peril-to-progress">Nato," the west and Russia: from peril to progress</a>", 23 September 2008). </p><p>The third consequence, a matter of some small consolation to the Georgians, is that Russia has shown how ruthlessly it can act and with how little regard for its image in the rest of the world without winning it much of the way of diplomatic benefit. It has, for example, failed to get <a href=""http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav101708.shtml">recognition</a>" for Abkhazian and South Ossetian statehood from anyone except <a href="http://www.opendemocracy.net/xml/rss/home/index.xml/"/www.opendemocracy.net/democracy_power/politics_protest/nicaragua_ortega">Daniel" Ortega's Nicaragua </a>and a leader of Hamas, while alarming China and other states by the precedent it has set for cultivating and appropriating neighbouring countries' <a href="http://www.opendemocracy.net/xml/rss/home/index.xml/"/article/china/democracy_power/tibet_questions_of_revolt">rebellious</a>" minorities. Russia has resumed the unhappy isolation of which Alexander III complained in the late 1880s when he declared Montenegro to be Russia's only friend in Europe. Even <a href=""http://go.hrw.com/atlas/norm_htm/armenia.htm">Armenia</a>," its other friend in the Caucasus, has been badly <a href=""http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav091008b.shtml">affected</a>" by the war with Georgia, and is physically cut off from Russia for the foreseeable future by the closure of the Abkhaz-Georgian border. </p><p>South Ossetia's "independence" is a fiction: nobody believes that it will be anything but a dependency of Russia. The addition of 70,000 more Ossetians to Russia's Caucasian empire is already exacerbating an undeclared and unreported civil war now fermenting, if not raging, between Ingushetia and Ossetia. The Ingush, <a href=""http://eng.kavkaz-uzel.ru/newstext/engnews/id/1208300.html">exiled</a>" like the Chechens in 1944, came back after the second world war to find many of their homes occupied by Ossetians; the tensions continued for decades after the war, and were intensified by Vladimir Putin's stupidity when (in 2002) he <a href=""http://www.kommersant.com/p1050086/r_527/Ingushetia_regional_leaders/">replaced</a>" the Ingush leader General Aushev with a KGB pawn, Murat Zyazikov. The latter was himself <a href=""http://mnweekly.ru/national/20081106/55355194.html">sacked</a>" by Dmitri Medvedev on 30 October 2008. This conflict will escalate. </p><p>Abkhazia, in contrast, may be considered a positive acquisition for Russia. It is probable that property prices will rise, to the joy of all the Russian officials and businessmen who have bought up empty villas and hotels on the <a href=""http://www.randomhouse.co.uk/catalog/book.htm?command=Search&db=main.txt&eqisbndata=009952046X">Black" Sea</a> coast; and there is now cheap concrete and stone for the winter Olympics site planned for Sochi in 2014. The Abkhaz writer Fazil Iskander's novel <em><a href=""http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9402E4D81338F936A25756C0A965948260&sec=&spon=&pagewanted=all">Uncle" Sandro from Chegem</a></em> conveys better than any tract how the <a href=""http://www.omniglot.com/writing/abkhaz.htm">Abkhaz" </a>feel they can manipulate their Russian overlords skilfully enough to maintain <em>de facto</em> independence - a game which is much harder to win if the overlord is a fellow Caucasian, i.e. a Georgian. Even so, there are in Abkhaz <a href="http://www.opendemocracy.net/xml/rss/home/index.xml/"/russia/article/akhazia-wedded-to-independence">ruling" circles </a>a number of nationalists who want genuine independence, which it is certain Putin and Medvedev have no intention of granting. Over the years it is thus likely that the Georgians will be consoled by the sight of some Abkhazians resisting Russian colonialism. </p><p><strong>An exit from impasse</strong> </p><p>Georgia may have emerged the greater loser from the August 2008 war, but there is as yet no Georgian politician - even in opposition, far less in government - who has shown the intellect, character or set of ideas to persuade any significant force inside or outside the country to support him or <a href=""http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=19821">her</a>" as a replacement for a tarnished Mikheil Saakashvili (see Robert Parsons, "<a href="http://www.opendemocracy.net/xml/rss/home/index.xml/"/article/georgia-the-politics-of-recovery">Georgia:" the politics of recovery</a>", 23 October 2008) </p><p><a href=""http://www.eurasianet.org/geovote08/gallery/mikheil.shtml">Saakashvili</a>" is a mass of contradictions: a man of mendaciousness and violent impulsiveness, even lawlessness, whose flaws are compensated by his quick wits, understanding of how other politicians think, and determination to act on decisions, all leavened by the remnants of his original charisma. Dependent as he is on foreign support, with greater supervision and accountability he could still bring Georgia out of its present mess. The <a href=""http://www.scarecrowpress.com/Catalog/SingleBook.shtml?command=Search&db="^DB/CATALOG.db&eqSKUdata=0810855801">country</a> is both small and under-resourced enough (depopulated by emigration, for example) to absorb its refugees; and, if finance is made available for structural changes, it could produce enough food, energy, services, and even manufactured products for prosperity. When it rebuilds its military forces it will have less reason to buy expensive <a href="http://www.opendemocracy.net/xml/rss/home/index.xml/"/conflicts/caucasus_fractures/georgia_military">weaponry</a>" for an aggressive war and can spend money more effectively on intelligence and equipment for interception and defence. </p><p>It is probably too late to salvage anything from the loss of the territories (see Neal Ascherson, "<a href="http://www.opendemocracy.net/xml/rss/home/index.xml/"/article/after-the-war-recognising-reality-in-abkhazia-and-georgia">After" the war: recognising reality in Abkhazia and Georgia</a>", 15 August 2008). Here too however, a certain <a href=""http://www.economist.com/world/europe/displaystory.cfm?story_id=11670692">flexibility</a>" backed by strong advice might offer a way forward: if Georgia and its western allies offered a guarantee of non-interference and a recognition of a genuinely independent Abkhazia, free of Russian armed forces, some Abkhaz might still be tempted, even though most would be suspicious and continue to side with their Russian protectors. </p><p>A necessary political reorientation is, however, already taking place. What western powers have tried in vain to achieve - namely to persuade the three south Caucasian states that they have more interests in common than in conflict - may be achieved from another direction: Turkey. The Turks have skilfully managed to develop relations with Georgia without supporting the Georgian aim of reconquering Abkhazia, and financed part of Tbilisi's <a href="http://www.opendemocracy.net/xml/rss/home/index.xml/"/www.opendemocracy.net/article/russian-war-georgian-democracy">education</a>" system and economy. </p><p>It may even be that the railway linking Tbilisi to Kars will no longer be of <a href=""http://www.caucaz.com/home_eng/breve_contenu.php?id=303">strategic</a>" importance: for the <a href=""http://www.economist.com/world/europe/displaystory.cfm?story_id=12304946">rapprochement</a>" between Turkey and Armenia, marked by President Abdullah Gül's attendance at a football match in Yerevan in September 2008, may end with the opening of the border and the restoration of the Soviet-era railway from Kars to Yerevan (and thence to Tbilisi). For some <a href=""http://www.jamestown.org/edm/article.php?article_id=2373261">time</a>" there have, in fact, been scheduled flights between Turkey and Armenia; buses regularly go from Yerevan to Istanbul via Georgia, and Armenians are given visas on the Turkish border. Turkey has the <a href=""http://www.kuwaittimes.net/read_news.php?newsid=NjIzMzIyODgz">diplomatic" skills</a> to keep Azerbaijan assured of its fraternal support, particularly over the Nagorno-Karabakh question, and at the same time bring Armenia in out of the cold, weaning it from its <a href=""http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav101708.shtml">dependence</a>" on Russia and Iran (see Fred Halliday, "<a href="http://www.opendemocracy.net/xml/rss/home/index.xml/"/article/armenia-s-mixed-messages">Armenia's" mixed messages</a>", 15 October 2008). </p><p>If Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan agree to set aside some of their differences, recognise the benefits of cooperation and look for access to the west through Turkey (rather than Russia), then the net benefit to Georgia of the August 2008 war might even begin to exceed the net losses. If western politicians can take measure of the gap between their rhetoric and their capabilities when dealing with Russia - and either tone down the former or step up the latter - the overall outcome could in the end be more positive than seemed conceivable when the rockets started to rain down on Tskhinvali. </p><div class="rating-item"><div class="rating" id="rating_mean_46795"><div class="rating-intro"><span class="rating-intro-text">Average rating</span></div><div class="star avg on"><a style="width: 100%;" onclick="return false;"> </a></div><div class="star avg on"><a style="width: 100%;" onclick="return false;"> </a></div><div class="star avg on"><a style="width: 100%;" onclick="return false;"> </a></div><div class="star avg on"><a style="width: 100%;" onclick="return false;"> </a></div><div class="star avg on"><a style="width: 100%;" onclick="return false;"> </a></div><div class="num-votes">(<span id="rating_num_votes_46795">3</span> votes)</div></div><form action="/xml/rss/home/index.xml?" method="post" id="rating_form_46795" class="rating" title="Rating: 5.0"><div><div class="form-item"> <label for="rating_options_46795">Rate this: </label> <select name="edit[rating]" class="form-select rating-options" title="Rate this" id="rating_options_46795" ><option value="0">---</option><option value="100" selected="selected">Excellent!</option><option value="80">Great!</option><option value="60">Good</option><option value="40">Quite good</option><option value="20">Not so great</option></select></div><input type="hidden" name="edit[nid]" id="edit-nid" value="46795" /><input type="submit" name="op" value="Submit" class="form-submit" /><input type="hidden" name="edit[form_id]" id="edit-rating-form-46795" value="rating_form_46795" /></div></form></div> http://www.opendemocracy.net/article/georgia-and-russia-the-aftermath#comment email openDemocracy-theme russia russia & eurasia conflicts democracy & power caucasus: regional fractures Creative Commons normal Donald Rayfield Russia Thu, 20 Nov 2008 10:30:15 +0000 46795 at http://www.opendemocracy.net Evo and Bolivia: the next campaign , John Crabtree http://www.opendemocracy.net/article/evo-morales-and-bolivia-the-next-campaign <p>President Evo Morales of Bolivia is now ableto prepare for a referendum in January 2009 on the country's new constitution,following a historic deal with the centre-right congressional opposition on 21October 2008 which enabled the document to win acceptance. To secure thisagreement involved the president making significant concessions. But it is notyet clear if this flexibility will end the sort of political confrontation thatled to widespread violence as recently as September (see Carin Zissis, "<a href=""http://www.as-coa.org/article.php?id=1297">Bolivia" Bridges Political Divide</a>", AS/CoA, 21 October 2008).</p><p><span class="pullquote_new">John Crabtree isa research associate at Oxford University's <a href=""http://www.lac.ox.ac.uk/index.htm">Centre" for Latin American Studies</a>. He is (onBolivia) author of <em>Patterns of Protest:Politics and Social Movements in Bolivia</em> (Latin America Bureau, 2005) andco-editor of <a href=""http://www.upress.pitt.edu/BookDetails.aspx?bookId=35924"><em>Unresolved" Tensions: Bolivia Past and Present</em></a> (PittsburghUniversity Press, 2008); and (on Peru) author of <em>Peru under Garcia: Opportunity Lost </em>(Macmillan, 1992) andFujimori's Peru (ILAS, 1998), and editor of <a href=""http://www.brookings.edu/press/Books/2006/makinginstitutionsworkinperu.aspx"><em>Making" I</em><em>n</em><em>stitutions Work in Peru: Democracy, Development andInequality since 1980</em></a>(Institute for the Study of the Americas,London University / Brookings Institution Press, 2006)<br /><br />Among JohnCrabtree's articles on Bolivia in <strong>openDemocracy</strong>:<br /><br />"<a href="http://www.opendemocracy.net/xml/rss/home/index.xml/"/node/3210">Evo" Morales'schallenge</a>" (25 January 2006)<br /><br />"<a href="http://www.opendemocracy.net/xml/rss/home/index.xml/"/democracy-protest/bolivia_twothirds_3910.jsp">Bolivia:" thebattle for two-thirds</a>" (18 September 2006)<br /><br />"<a href="http://www.opendemocracy.net/xml/rss/home/index.xml/"/democracy-protest/experiment_4575.jsp">Latin" Americandemocracy: time to experiment</a>" (30 April 2007)<br /><br /><strong>"</strong><a href="http://www.opendemocracy.net/xml/rss/home/index.xml/"/article/democracy_power/politics_protest/bolivia_three_cities">Bolivia:" atale of two (or rather three) cities</a>" (18 September 2007)<br /><br />"<a href="http://www.opendemocracy.net/xml/rss/home/index.xml/"/article/democracy_power/politics_protest/bolivia_constitution">Bolivia'scontroversial" constitution</a>" (10 December 2007)<br /><br /><strong>"</strong><a href="http://www.opendemocracy.net/xml/rss/home/index.xml/"/article/democracy_power/politics_protest/santa_cruzs_referendum_farewell_bolivia">Santa" Cruz's referendum,Bolivia's choice</a>"(30 April 2008)<br /><br />"<a href="http://www.opendemocracy.net/xml/rss/home/index.xml/"/article/bolivia-s-democratic-tides">Bolivia's" democratic tides</a>" (1 July 2008)<br /><br />"<a href="http://www.opendemocracy.net/xml/rss/home/index.xml/"/article/bolivia-s-political-ferment-revolution-and-recall">Bolivia's" political ferment:revolution and recall</a>" (13 August 2008) <br /></span></p><p>The significance of what<a href=""http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/americas/7681413.stm">happened</a>" in Bolivia's congress is that it creates the prospect that - after two and a halfyears of political wrangling - Bolivia's new constitution will see the light ofday. The amended text formed the basis of the 21 October <a href=""http://www.angus-reid.com/polls/view/32087/bolivians_encourage_active_negotiations">agreement</a>" between the government and mostopposition members; in turn this allowed a law to be passed whichprescribed the holding of a referendum to ratify the document. The vote will takeplace on 25 January 2009. The constitution will almost certainly be approved;if so, fresh presidential and congressional elections will be held in December2009 - with Evo Morales likely to win a further term in office. </p><p>The deal was struck amid the arrival in La Paz of thousands of government supporters who, determined to see the referendum lawapproved, had marched towards the capital. Many had walked for days across the inhospitable Altiplano. Morales,who is always eager to associate himself with his country's social movements,joined their ranks as they entered the city. The congress voted to accept thecompromise deal on its own, but the presence of mineworkers - who let offdynamite in the square outside the legislative building - may have sharpenedits members' resolve. </p><p><strong>Apower conceded </strong></p><p>A number of concessions was the price that the<a href=""http://www.presidencia.gov.bo/presidente/perfil.asp">president</a>" had to pay to win the necessary two-thirdsmajority in congress. All in all, more than 140 articles of the original draftconstitution - agreed upon by the ruling <em>Movimientoal Socialismo</em> (MAS) and its allies in December 2007 in the city of Oruro -were changed. Some of the changes were minor, but at least half were substantive(see "<a href="http://www.opendemocracy.net/xml/rss/home/index.xml/"/article/democracy_power/politics_protest/bolivia_constitution">Bolivia's" controversialconstitution</a>",10 December 2007). </p><p>In particular, they involved meeting theopposition half-way on the issue of departmental autonomy, the most overt areaof disagreement since the opposition decided to boycott the constituentassembly last December. Four of Bolivia's nine departments - all in the <a href=""http://photo.goliathus.com/bolivia/pictures/map-of-bolivia.jpg">lowland</a>" <em>medialuna</em> ("half-moon") rejected the draft constitution as it stood, andproceeded to issue what they called "statutes of autonomy". These were <em>de facto</em> declarations ofquasi-independence, subsequently approved in unofficial referenda in the four departmentsconcerned (Santa Cruz, Tarija, Beni and Pando). The campaign for autonomyreached a climax in a spate of violent <a href=""http://www.as-coa.org/article.php?id=1246&nav=res&subid=47">confrontation</a>s" in Santa Cruz and elsewhere in September2008; for months it has seemed set to tear the country apart (see "<a href="http://www.opendemocracy.net/xml/rss/home/index.xml/"/article/democracy_power/politics_protest/santa_cruzs_referendum_farewell_bolivia">Santa" Cruz's referendum,Bolivia's choice</a>",30 April 2008).</p><p>But in order to secure a deal, concessions onautonomy were not enough: Evo Morales had to take three further steps. First,he agreed not to make limits on agricultural landholding in eastern Boliviaretroactive. A parallel referendum will now be held (on 25 January) on thisissue; but even if voters agree to impose a 5,000-hectare limit on landedestates, existing landowners - many of whom have landholdings far in excess ofthe limit - will not be affected. Theywill just have to show that the land they hold is not idle and fulfils a"social" and "economic" purpose.</p><p>Second, Morales agreed to limit his ability tostand again as president to a single five-year term. Under the <a href=""http://pdba.georgetown.edu/Constitutions/Bolivia/bolivia.html">existing</a>" 1967 constitution, a Bolivian presidentcannot succeed himself. This prohibition was lifted in the original draft ofthe new constitution, allowing Morales the possibility of running for twofurther terms. This opened the possibility of him staying in office until2019. The compromise arrangementsecures the president's agreement not to stay beyond 2014 (assuming he isre-elected in 2009). </p><p>Third, the government has accepted that anychanges to the new constitution must have the support of at least two-thirds ofcongress, not just a simple majority as stipulated in the Oruro document. Thiswould make it harder for the MAS - if re-elected next year - to then change theconstitution once again, for instance lifting the bar on re-election beyond2014. By the same token, however, it makes it harder for opposition parties toamend the new constitution. </p><p><strong>Apresident strengthened</strong></p><p>The deal between Evo Morales and theopposition is, in many respects, a significant victory for the president. A majorityof the articles agreed upon in the original draft constitution stands; a sourceof major political friction between the government and its opponents isremoved. In addition, Morales has managed to engineer a division in theopposition separating its more moderate members in congress from its moreextreme leaders in the departments of the east. Indeed, members of the civiccommittees in the <a href=""http://www.boliviaenlared.com/imagenes/mapa-bolivia-politico.jpg"><em>media" luna</em></a> feelbadly let down by their putative political representatives. </p><p>The period leading up to the agreement wassignificant in shaping this outcome, as the balance of power between Moralesand the main opposition leaders shifted in three significant ways. </p><p>First, in a "recall referendum" in August2008, more than two-thirds of the electorate voted for Morales to stay inoffice. This degree of <a href=""http://www.angus-reid.com/polls/view/31489/morales_still_draws_high_support_in_bolivia">support</a>" took even his supporters by surprise. Itgreatly exceeded his margin of victory (54%) - itself a historic landslide - inthe presidential <a href=""http://www.electionguide.org/country.php?ID=27">election</a>" of December 2005. Even in large parts of the <em>media luna</em> the majority of people votedfor Morales, thus exploding the myth that support for the government and oppositionwas somehow evenly split between east and west. Those voting against Moraleswere mainly residents of urban areas in the <em>medialuna</em>.</p><p><span class="pullquote_new">Also in <strong>openDemocracy</strong> on Bolivian politics andsocial struggles:<br /><br />Nick Buxton, "<a href="http://www.opendemocracy.net/xml/rss/home/index.xml/"/democracy-protest/gas_2584.jsp">Bolivia" inrevolt</a>" (8 June 2005)<br /><br />Nick Buxton, "<a href="http://www.opendemocracy.net/xml/rss/home/index.xml/"/democracy-protest/bolivia_3131.jsp">Revolutionarytimes" in Bolivia?</a>" (16 December 2005)<br /><br />Justin Vogler, "<a href="http://www.opendemocracy.net/xml/rss/home/index.xml/"/article/bolivia-nears-the-edge">Bolivia" nears the precipice</a>" (17 September 2006)<br /></span>Second, the violence that <a href=""http://www.economist.com/world/americas/displaystory.cfm?story_id=12260915">shook</a>" Bolivia in September - including the seizure andransacking of government offices, the blocking of highways, attacks on gasinstallations (crucial for exports), and the killing of many governmentsupporters in the remote northern department of Pando - helped shift the positionof some previously outspoken opposition leaders. The scale of the crisis madean accommodation, principally with the Podemos grouping, easier to negotiate. Agood deal of the violence was actually perpetrated by youth groups associatedwith the departmental "civic committees" (see Justin Vogler, "<a href="http://www.opendemocracy.net/xml/rss/home/index.xml/"/article/bolivia-nears-the-edge">Bolivia" nears the precipice</a>", 17 September 2008).</p><p>Third, the threat to democracy in Bolivia andits integrity as a country obliged external actors to get involved. The Unasurgrouping of South American presidents, meeting in Chile in September, <a href=""http://alainet.org/active/26705&lang=es">pledged</a>its" full support to Morales. It offered its services - alongside those of theOrganisation of American States (OAS), the United Nations, and the EuropeanUnion - to help broker an agreement that would restore calm. These pledges infact played an important part behind the scenes in helping stage a process of dialoguebetween the government, the opposition local prefects and the civic committees.Seldom has a Bolivian president - especially one who only weeks before had<a href=""http://www.economist.com/world/americas/displaystory.cfm?story_id=12564058">expelled</a>" the United States ambassador for allegedly helping foment the unrest -received such a clear show of international support. </p><p><strong>Apath sighted</strong></p><p>Now, with the constitution <a href=""http://alainet.org/active/27160&lang=en">agreed</a>," Evo Moralescan anticipate a clear "yes" vote in the 25 January 2009 referendum; a victorythat would be a springboard to his probable re-election as president in Decembernext year. He will also be hoping that this time, his margin of victory issufficient to clinch an absolute majority for the <em>Movimiento al Socialismo</em> in both houses of congress. Until now, theopposition majority in the senate has enabled Podemos and its allies to blockkey items on the government's legislative agenda. </p><p>But the road ahead may not be quite asstraightforward as this suggests; the political polarisation between thegovernment and its most bitter <a href=""http://as.americas-society.org/article.php?id=1120&nav=res&subid=47">critics</a>" in the dissident civic committees will notsimply disappear. </p><p>The <em>ComitéPro-Santa Cruz</em>, which is by far the most powerful of the civic organisationsin eastern Bolivia, has already indicated its dissatisfaction with theagreement between the government and the main opposition parties. Indeed, mostof Santa Cruz's Podemos congressmen voted against the law enabling thereferendum to go ahead, an act of defiance against the party leadership of <a href=""http://www.terra.es/personal2/monolith/bolivia.htm">former" president</a> Jorge Quiroga. The local leaders in SantaCruz say they will rally their supporters for a "no" vote in the Januaryreferendum. The civic leaders in <a href=""http://www.boliviaweb.com/cities/sucre.htm">Sucre</a>" are equally bitter, since their demandsthat their city be restored to its historical role as full capital of Boliviawere blatantly ignored in the agreement. </p><p>There are at least two main issues on whichthese civic committees can continue to harry the government and frustrate itsagenda. Perhaps the more important will be defining what departmental autonomyis actually going to mean in practice, and especially how rents from extractiveindustries (chiefly natural gas) are going to be divided up between the centralgovernment, the departmental authorities, municipalities and <a href=""http://www.apcob.org.bo/pagina.php?page=etnicos&cont=perf_etnicos">indigenous</a>" organisations; the third and fourth of theseare now supposed also to enjoy rights of autonomy. The civic groups in SantaCruz and Tarija, in particular, will continue to demand a bigger share of theproceeds of gas exports. The prefects of the <em>media luna</em>, now to be known as governors, also demonstrated theextent of their own <a href=""http://www.csmonitor.com/2008/0603/p06s01-woam.html">support</a>" in the August recall referendum by winningmargins not dissimilar to those of Morales (see "<a href="http://www.opendemocracy.net/xml/rss/home/index.xml/"/article/bolivia-s-democratic-tides">Bolivia's" democratic tides</a>", 2 July 2008)</p><p>The land issue, too, will continue to be acause of disaffection. The concession made by the government on limiting theretroactive effects of agrarian reform will take some of the sting out of thisquestion, but conflicts over landholding will continue to be commonplacethroughout the <em>media luna</em>. Landownersare often armed and prepared to defend their interests by force, and the governmentin La Paz is poorly placed to defend the interests of those who either demandaccess to land (landless peasants) or those who try to defend the lands againstoutsiders (such as indigenous groups).</p><p>So while the new constitution may now belegally enacted, battles are looming over how its provisions are finallyapplied. </p><p>At the same time, Bolivia is being affected bythe worsening international economic climate, in particular the fall incommodity prices for hydrocarbons and minerals. This will reduce thepresident's ability to use these rents to fund social spending. It will alsolead to increased levels of unemployment and poverty in this, south America'spoorest country. Evo Morales's opponents will seek to capitalise on this if a"yes" victory in the January 2009 referendum leads to fresh presidentialelections in December. Bolivia seems set for another epic political year.</p><div class="rating-item"><div class="rating" id="rating_mean_46822"><div class="rating-intro"><span class="rating-intro-text">Average rating</span></div><div class="star avg on"><a style="width: 100%;" onclick="return false;"> </a></div><div class="star avg on"><a style="width: 100%;" onclick="return false;"> </a></div><div class="star avg on"><a style="width: 100%;" onclick="return false;"> </a></div><div class="star avg on"><a style="width: 100%;" onclick="return false;"> </a></div><div class="star avg"><a style="width: 100%;" onclick="return false;"> </a></div><div class="num-votes">(<span id="rating_num_votes_46822">1</span> vote)</div></div><form action="/xml/rss/home/index.xml?" method="post" id="rating_form_46822" class="rating" title="Rating: 4.0"><div><div class="form-item"> <label for="rating_options_46822">Rate this: </label> <select name="edit[rating]" class="form-select rating-options" title="Rate this" id="rating_options_46822" ><option value="0">---</option><option value="100">Excellent!</option><option value="80" selected="selected">Great!</option><option value="60">Good</option><option value="40">Quite good</option><option value="20">Not so great</option></select></div><input type="hidden" name="edit[nid]" id="edit-nid" value="46822" /><input type="submit" name="op" value="Submit" class="form-submit" /><input type="hidden" name="edit[form_id]" id="edit-rating-form-46822" value="rating_form_46822" /></div></form></div> http://www.opendemocracy.net/article/evo-morales-and-bolivia-the-next-campaign#comment email latin america democracy & power Creative Commons normal globalisation institutions & government John Crabtree politics of protest Wed, 19 Nov 2008 10:45:37 +0000 46822 at http://www.opendemocracy.net DR Congo: dynamic of conflict, Gérard Prunier http://www.opendemocracy.net/article/war-in-the-dr-congo-group-nation-power-state <p>Since August 2008 the situation in the east of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) has grown progressively worse in ways that seem hard to understand. An overview of the events and processes that led to the resurgence of conflict, however, can explain what is happening and what kind of intervention can contribute to resolving it.</p><p class="pullquote_new"><br />Gérard Prunier is research professor at the University of Paris. He is the author of <a href=""http://www.hurstpub.co.uk/hurst/bookdetails.asp?book=119"><em>The" Rwanda Crisis: History of a Genocide</em></a> (C Hurst, 1998), <a href=""http://www.hurstpub.co.uk/hurst/bookdetails.asp?book=209"><em>Darfur:" The Ambiguous Genocide</em></a><em> </em>(C Hurst, revised edition, 2007), and <a href=""http://www.hurstpub.co.uk/bookdetails.asp?book=298"><em>From" Gen</em><em>o</em><em>cide to Continental War: The ‘Congolese' Conflict and the Crisis of Conte</em><em>m</em><em>porary Africa</em></a> (C Hurst, 2006)<br /><br />Also by Gérard Prunier in <strong>openDemocracy</strong>:<br /><br />"<a href="http://www.opendemocracy.net/xml/rss/home/index.xml/"/democracy-africa_democracy/darfur_conflict_3909.jsp">Darfur's" Sudan problem</a>" (15 September 2006)<br /><br />"<a href="http://www.opendemocracy.net/xml/rss/home/index.xml/"/democracy-africa_democracy/drc_prunier_4434.jsp">The" DR Congo's political opportunity</a>" (14 March 2007)<br /><br />"<a href="http://www.opendemocracy.net/xml/rss/home/index.xml/"/democracy-africa_democracy/chad_conflict_4538.jsp">Chad," the CAR and Darfur: dynamics of conflict</a>" (18 April 2007)<br /><br />"<a href="http://www.opendemocracy.net/xml/rss/home/index.xml/"/article/democracy_power/africa/chad_tragedy">Chad's" tragedy</a>" (7 September 2007)<br /><br />"<a href="http://www.opendemocracy.net/xml/rss/home/index.xml/"/article/democracy_power/africa_democracy/sudan">Sudan" between war and peace</a>" (1 November 2007)<br /><br />"<a href="http://www.opendemocracy.net/xml/rss/home/index.xml/"/article/democracy_power/khartoum_calculated_fever">Khartoum's" calculated fever</a>" (5 December 2007)<br /><br />"<a href="http://www.opendemocracy.net/xml/rss/home/index.xml/"/node/35512">Kenya:" roots of crisis</a>" (7 January 2008)<br /><br />"<a href="http://www.opendemocracy.net/xml/rss/home/index.xml/"/article/democracy_power/africa/chad_sudan_darfur">Chad:" between Sudan's blitzkrieg and Darfur's war</a>" (19 February 2008)<br /><br />"<a href="http://www.opendemocracy.net/xml/rss/home/index.xml/"/article/democracy/kenya_behind_the_crisis">Kenya:" histories of hidden war</a>" (29 February 2008)<br /><br />"<a href="http://www.opendemocracy.net/xml/rss/home/index.xml/"/article/sudan-in-a-fix-0">Sudan" in a fix</a>" (26 June 2008)<br /><br />"<a href="http://www.opendemocracy.net/xml/rss/home/index.xml/"/article/sudan-s-omar-al-bashir-a-useful-war-criminal">Sudan's" Omar al-Bashir: a useful war criminal</a>" (15 October 2008) </p><p>The <a href=""http://go.hrw.com/atlas/norm_htm/congodem.htm">DR" Congo</a>, devastated by years of civil and foreign wars between 1996 and 2003, had managed to sign a peace agreement, disarm most of the combatants, navigate the dangers of a transition period (2003-06), and finally (in July-October 2006) hold successful democratic <a href=""http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=4081&l=1">elections</a>." But the eastern part of the <a href=""http://www.congo-pages.org/geo.htm">country</a>" had never healed. Why? </p><p>The heart of the answer is that the eastern problem had existed before the war, was made worse by the war and was not addressed by the peace agreement. The eastern Congo is a dense ethnic mix where Banyarwanda (people of <a href=""http://www.rwandagateway.org/article.php3?id_article=114">Rwandese</a>" ethnic origin) make up a large <a href=""http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/mar/assessment.asp?groupId=49009">segment</a>" of the population, at least in North Kivu where they represent about 40% of the total (in South Kivu, the Rwandese-speaking <a href=""http://www.roape.org/cgi-bin/roape/show/9309.html">Banyamulenge</a>" are only about 4%). The high population densities (reaching almost 300 people / square km around Goma) are an important factor in the development of strong tensions around landholding. These tensions were worsened by two factors: </p><p>* during the <a href=""http://www.congo2005.be/geheugen/frameset.php?lang=en">colonial" era</a> the Belgians brought thousands of Banyarwanda from Rwanda to work in the Kivus. But they were salaried workers on Belgian <a href=""http://cup.columbia.edu/book/978-0-231-06256-5/the-cohesion-of-oppression">plantations</a>" and did not own land. When the Belgians left these people wound up as landless peasants since the local tribes (Bahunde, Banyanga, Banande) were not ready to make room for them </p><p>* after the 1960-65 civil war which followed the Belgians' departure, <a href=""http://www.oup.com/uk/orc/bin/9780198781646/01student/biographies/joseph_desire_mobutu/">Joseph-Désiré" Mobutu</a> emerged as the <a href=""http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?action=conflict_search&l=1&t=1&c_country=37">state's</a>" authoritarian ruler. His personal secretary Barthélémy Bisengimana was a Rwandese Tutsi who <a href=""http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/content~content=a782792571~db=all">favoured</a>" his fellow tribesmen and helped them acquire land illegally. Since the Banyamulenge in South Kivu had fought in the civil war on Mobutu's side, the Rwandophone population became globally identified with Mobutu, a political perception which increased tension with the generally anti-Mobutu eastern tribes. </p><p><strong>Rwanda and DRC: context of conflict</strong> </p><p>By the early 1990s when Zaire (as it had been known since 1971, on <a href=""http://www.cachecoins.org/zaire.htm">Mobutu's</a>" orders) began to sink into a catastrophic economic crisis, the land tensions in the east escalated into a localised ethno-civil war. By 1992 there was full-scale fighting in | | |
